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ENFORCEMENT OF LEGISLATION PROHIBITING SALES
BELOW COST IN WASHINGTON
ELDON H. REILEY*

Mr. Reiley analyzes Washington's complex Unfair Practices Act
from the strengths and weaknesses of the defendant's position by
tracing the various requirements and defenses of the act under two
recent Washington Supreme Court decisions. To facilitate effective
enforcement he offers specific suggestions for future interpretationof
the act. Mr. Reiley especially urges that the intent to injure requirement be interpretedto require nothing more than proof of injury to a
competitor and that the meeting competition defense be limited to
require a seller to have actual knowledge of his competitor's current
prices and their legality.
After nearly twenty years of lying dormant,' the Washington Unfair
Practices Act 2 has been subject to a recent rash of litigation that appears to be the herald of widespread new endeavors to prohibit selling
below cost. Suit was recently commenced in Seattle by a major oil
company against eight competitors for allegedly selling gasoline below
cost.3 Threat of action under the act was used to stop a grocery price
war in Spokane in January 1965 and again in October 1966.1 Martin
v. Aleinikoff,5 decided in 1964, was the first case to reach the Wash*Instructor in Law, Gonzaga University Law School. B.S., Massachusetts Institute,
of Technology, 1955; LL.B., Harvard, 1958. For several years Mr. Reiley has been a
Special Assistant Attorney General concerned with enforcing the Unfair Practices
Act with respect to below cost sales of fryer chickens in eastern Washington. In
this capacity he participated in the recent trial and appeal of State ex rel. O'Connell
v. Albertsons, Inc. The author wishes to make it clear that the views expressed in
this article are his own, and do not represent an official position of the Washington
State Attorney General.
'The law was enacted in 1939. The only cases under the law to reach the Washington Supreme Court between that date and 1964 were State ex rel. Pay Less Drug
Stores v. Sutton, 2 Wn. 2d 532, 98 P.2d (1940), and State v. Sears, 4 Wn. 2d 200,
1032 P.2d 337 (1940).
WASH. REv. CODE ch. 19.90 (1959). Relevant sections of this statute are set out
in full in Appendix, Part A.
' Tidewater Oil Co. v. American Oil Co., Humble Oil Co., Richfield Oil Co., Socony
Mobile Oil Co., Shell Oil Co., Standard Oil Co. of California, Texaco, Inc., Union Oil
Co. of California, King County Super. Ct. No. 631536. A judgment of voluntary nonsuit was filed Sept. 3, 1965.
'Interviews With Arthur Hansen, Assistant Washington State Attorney General,
Spokane office, Nov. 1, 1965, and Oct. 5, 1966.
'63 Wn. 2d 842, 389 P.2d 422 (1964).
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ington Supreme Court since 1940,6 and State ex rel. O'Connell v.
Albertson's, Inc.,7 decided in 1966, is the only below cost sales case to
reach the court after a full trial on the merits.
The Unfair Practices Act prohibits: (1) selling a commodity below
cost; I and (2) discriminatory pricing between different sections of the
same community. 9
Washington law makes each violation not only a criminal offense" °
but also subject to a civil suit for an injunction or damages." Thirty
states have enacted similar laws aimed at below cost sales generally.'2
The unresolved legal problems confronting enforcement of below
cost sales legislation range from constitutional quandries to questions
involving allocation of the burden of proof. It is the purpose of this
article to probe into some of these problems, and especially to highlight
the strengths and weaknesses of the defendant's position in an action
under the Washington statute.
Legislation of this nature proceeds on the assumption that below
cost or "loss leader" prices are economically undesirable because they
tend to mislead the public by giving a false low cost image and tend to
eliminate competition by destroying weaker competitors. Such actions
are, therefore, declared unlawful. A merchant is free to compete as
he chooses in the above cost area, but he may lower his prices below
cost only within carefully prescribed statutory limitations.
Discussion of the merits of the economic policies behind the law will be
avoided.' 4 Questions as to the economic desirability of such legislation
'State v. Sears, 4 Wn. 2d 200, 103 P.2d 337 (1940). In 1959, the Court was indirectly concerned with the statute in Johnson v. Pate, 54 Wn. 2d 148, 338 P.2d 131
(1959), where it held that a writ of prohibition was not the proper mode of review
of a temporary injunction.
'68 Wash. Dec. 2d 254, 412 P.2d 755 (1966) ; 42 WASH. L. REv. 945 (1967).
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.90.040 (1959).
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.90.020 (1959).
9
' WASH. REV. CODE § 19.90.100 (1959).
U WASH REV. CODE § 19.90.090 (1959).
'See 2 TRADE REG. REP. ff 6571 (1965). In addition, there exist a number of
special below cost sales statutes aimed at a single commodity, usually cigarettes.
Washington has such legislation. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 19.91.010-.910 (1959).
"1WASH. REv. CODE § 19.90.070 (1959).
"4 There has been considerable comment on this aspect of the legislation. Those
favoring it include: Brandeis, Cutthroat Prices: The Conpetition That Kills, Harper's Weekly, Nov. 15, 1913, pp. 10-12; Clark, Statutory Restrictions on Selling Below
Cost, 11 VAND. L. REv. 105 (1957). Those opposing the legislation include Comment,
Sales, Below Cost Prohibitions: Private Price Fixing Under State Law, 57 YALE L. J.
391 (1948) ; UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON BUREAU OF BUSIN-ESS RESEARCH, REGULATION OF RETAIL COMPETITION IN WASHINGTON 33 (1963); Note, 42 WASH. L. REV.

945 (1967)
See also
sons:
The
powers

and authorities cited therein.
the comments of Hale, J., dissenting in State ex rel. O'Connell v. AlbertUnfair Practices Act was thus designed to exercise the state's police
in the field of trade and commerce; to convert the predator into a corn-
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have been resolved in its favor by the legislatures of this and most
other states, and constitutional challenges to the legislation have met
with almost unanimous rejection. 15
I. WHO CAN SUE?

Among the most remarkable features of the Unfair Practices Act are
its self-enforcement provisions. Not content to rely upon criminal
actions brought by the prosecuting attorney 6 or suits brought directly
by the attorney general, 17 the legislature authorized "any person" to go
to court. 8 Where only injunctive relief is sought it is not even necessary for the plaintiff to plead or prove actual damage as a condition of
relief.'
The extent to which this carte blanche invitation to suit is limited by
requirements of "standing" or the existence of a "case or controversy"
has not been litigated in this state. Obviously, there are some limitapetitor; to curtail the senseless and vicious practices inherent in cut-throat
competition and to narrow the areas of competition so that every merchant
would have at least a fair start in the race for business; to assure that every
competitor began the competitive race at the point of selling his merchandise
above cost, and thus reserving for the field of fair competition such activities as
planning, buying, advertising, service, courtesy, credit, general efficiency and
the multifarious skills inherent in the merchandising process.
Although some courts and legislatures have concluded that sales below cost prohibition is desirable, the statutes have been severely criticized by some commentators.
See Comment, Sales Below Cost Prohibitions: Private Price Fixing Under State
Law, supra; UNVERSrrv OF WASHINGTON BUREAU OF BusiNss RESEARCH, REGULATION OF RETAIL COmPETITION IN WASHINGTON 33 (1963); Note, 42 WAsH. L. REv.
(1967) and authorities cited therein.
" In State v. Sears, 4 Wn. 2d 200, 103 P.2d 337 (1940), the Washington court
upheld the constitutionality of the Unfair Practices Act. Decisions in which similar acts have withstood a challenge to their constitutionality in other states include Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. National Candy & Tobacco Co., 11
Cal. 2d 634, 82 P.2d 3 (1938); Moore v. Northern Kentucky Independent Food
Dealers Ass'n, 286 Ky. 24, 149 S.W.2d 755 (1941); Louisiana Wholesale Distrib.
Ass'n v. Rosenzweig, 214 La. 1, 36 So. 2d 403 (1948); Fournier v. Troianello, 332
Mass. 636, 127 N.E.2d 167 (1955); McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 292 N.W.
414 (1940) ; Associated Merchants v. Ormesher, 107 Mont. 530, 86 P.2d 1031 (1939) ;
Hill v. Kusy, 150 Neb. 653, 35 N.W.2d 594 (1949); McIntire v. Borofsky, 95 N.H.
174, 59 A.2d 471 (1948); Adwon v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 204 Okl. 199,
228 P.2d 376 (1951) ; Rust v. Griggs, 172 Tenn. 565, 113 S.W.2d 733 (1938) ; State
v. Ross, 259 Wis. 379, 48 N.W.2d 460 (1951); and State v. Langley. 53 Wyo. 332,
84 P.2d 767 (1938). Decisions striking down state unfair practice laws as constitutionally deficient include Mott's Super Markets, Inc. v. Frassinelli, 148 Conn.
481, 172 A.2d 381 (1961) ; State ex rel. Marshall v. Consumers Warehouse Market,
Inc., 185 Kan. 363, 343 P.2d 234 (1959); Daniel Loughran Co. v. Lord Baltimore
Candy & Tobacco Co., 12 A.2d 201 (Md. Ct. App. 1940); State v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., 16 N.J. Misc. 479, 2 A.2d 599 (Dist. Ct. 1938), aff'd, 123 N.J.L. 180,
8 A.2d 291 (1939) ; and Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A.2d 67 (1940). It
i- to be noted that the Mott's Super Market and Daniel Loughran Co. decisions held
the Connecticut and Maryland laws to be only partially deficient.
"WASH. REv. CODE § 19.90.100 (1959).
WASH. REv. CODE § 19.90.130 (1959).
REv. CODE § 19.90.090 (1959).

"WASH.

"Ibid.
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tions. It is doubtful that a consumer in Walla Walla could challenge
the potato prices of a supermarket in Bellingham, but query whether a
Walla Walla potato grower could. The enforcement provisions do
indicate a legislative desire to have the law widely (or cheaply) enforced-at present an unachieved result.
The statute removes the injunctive remedy from the equity side of
the court. If a violation has occurred, the court is directed to issue a
permanent injunction.20 There is no room for the exercise of discretion. There are no issues of "adequacy" of the legal remedy or "irreparable harm." The only question is whether an illegal sale below
cost has occurred.
Despite the fact that the civil remedies are available to anyone, enforcement actions are usually undertaken by the attorney general, by a
trade association or by a competitor of the defendant. Actions by trade
associations have occasionally been struck down in other jurisdictions
as price-fixing violating the federal anti-trust laws.2 ' In such cases the
association has usually been engaged in an attempt to fix minimum
prices without reference to the actual cost to the seller. But any combination of competitors with reference to prices is questionable under
the federal laws,2 2 and enforcement of this statute by a trade association of competitors inevitably provides a defendant with a potent
argument.
In an action by an individual competitor a "clean-hands" question
may be raised if the plaintiff has recently sold items below cost. However, since the complaining competitor is merely an instrument in the
legislature's device for enforcement of the statute, and since the injunction authorized by the statute is not discretionary, the cleanliness
of the plaintiff's hands should be irrelevant.
An enforcement action by the attorney general should be immune
from price-fixing objections. The laws of some states establish a special commissioner, who may become a kind of price-czar, passing on
the legality of prices before they are offered. 23 If a state official broad20Ibid.

'United States v. San Diego Grocers Ass'n,

TRADE REG.

REP. (1962 Trade Cas.)

if 70,432 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 1962); United States v. Connecticut Food Council,

Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1940-43 Trade Cas.) ff 56,167 (D. Conn. Nov. 5, 1941);
United States v. Rhode Island Food Council, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1940-43 Trade
Cas.) if 56,175 (D.R.I. Dec. 19, 1941). But see 2 TRADE REG. REP. ff 6803 (1965)
for a listing of states whose unfair practice laws specifically permit trade associations
to bring suit.
' Sherman Anti-Trust Act §1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
' The Idaho Unfair Sales Act allows the governor to supervise the administration of the act himself or to delegate this authority to "any department of the state
government." IDAHO CODE ArN. § 48-408 (Supp. 1965). A Director of Fair Trade
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casts to a group of competing merchants the price at which they can
legally sell certain commodities at some future time, the result is much
the same as the price-fixing the federal laws are designed to prevent.
Even without a statutory price-czar, an attorney general could become involved in this delicate area, if in addition to bringing enforcement actions, he passes judgment on the legality of specific prices before they are offered.2 4
Other problems face the attorney general when he brings an action
after a period of nonenforcement, or against only one merchandiser
when others are selling below cost, or with respect to one commodity
when others are being sold below cost. He is likely to be charged with
discriminatory enforcement. To maintain such a challenge successfully, the defendant must show not merely that the attorney general is
picking and choosing his case, but that he is deliberately or arbitrarily
persecuting the defendant and ignoring other obvious violations.25
In Washington a number of the enforcement actions have been
commenced by or on behalf of agricultural commodity commissions
created under the Agricultural Enabling Act.2 Such actions are
brought with respect to the commodity or group of commodities with
which the commission is concerned. In these cases the commission
does not sue out of concern for the consumer interest or even the retail
competitor, but is, rather, seeking to protect the commodity producer
by maintaining a floor under retail prices. This interest, while legitimate, (and while such action by the commission is clearly authorized
by the Agricultural Enabling Act27 ) is not necessarily identical with
the stated purpose of the Unfair Practices Act.28 To escape possible
and Unfair Sales Acts has been appointed. The Director is frequently asked to
advise whether a competitor's price is legal so that it may be met. (See discussion
of meeting competition defense, infra.) He is occasionally asked to clear a price
in advance. Interview With Winfield D. Stearns, Idaho Director of Fair Trade and
Unfair Sales Act, January 11, 1967.
"The meeting competition defense, WAsH. REV. CODE § 19.90.070(4) (1959),
allows a merchant to meet the prices of a competitor by selling below cost only if
the competitor's prices are legal (or believed to be so). A merchant cannot be expected to ask his competitor what it paid for its sale item. There must be other
methods to determine legality quickly. See note 77 infra. It is, therefore, inevitable
that a responsible state official will be requested to advise merchants whether they
can legally meet a price under the meeting competition defense. Efficient administration of the statute requires that this advice be given. Query: Is this to be distinguished from advising a merchant what price he can legally initiate?
For a discussion of this problem see People v. Gordon, 234 P.2d 287, 293-94 (Cal.
Ct. App.
1951).
3
' WASH. REv. CODE §§ 15.66.010-.900 (1961).
"WASH. REv. CODE §§ 15.66.030(4), .210 (1961).
z WASH. REv. CODE § 19.90.910 (1959) provides:
Construction. The legislature declares that the purpose of this chapter is to
safeguard the public against the creation or perpetuation of monopolies and to
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objections based on this ground, the commissions have frequently
asked the Attorney General to bring actions in his name. In view of
legislative reliance on private enforcement, however, the actual motives
of the plaintiff-whether he be a consumer, a competitor or a commission-should be irrelevant.
It has been generally assumed that a violation of the below cost
statute requires proof of: (1) a sale or advertisement, (2) at a price
below cost, (3) which produces an injurious effect, (4) which is done
with a proscribed purpose or intent, and (5) which is not justified by
one of the defenses enumerated in the statute.2 9 In the comments that
follow, the cost, injury, and intent requirements and the meeting competition defense will be examined.
II. THE COST CONCEPT
The

statute 0

defines "cost" as "the invoice cost or replacement

foster and encourage competition, by prohibiting unfair, dishonest, deceptive,
destructive, fraudulent and discriminatory practices by which fair and honest
competition is destroyed or prevented. This chapter shall be liberally construed that its beneficial purposes may be subserved.
Most states, including Washington, patterned their statutes after the California
laws, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17100 (West 1964). Through typographical
error, California originally enacted its law to require "literal construction' instead
of "liberal constructiom" CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17002 (West 1964). This error
was corrected by the California Legislature in 1941. In their haste to follow California's example, six other states-Arkansas, Colorado, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska and Wyoming--enacted California's typographical error, requiring later
amendment.
It will be noted that the purpose expressed in the Washington statute is protection of
competition and protection of competitors. One authority has submitted that laws
regulating competition can be classified into those whose purpose is to protect competitors and those whose purpose is to protect competition:
These laws regarding competition are of two kinds. The first, exemplified by
the antitrust laws, seeks to foster and preserve the freest sort of competition.
The second type, exemplified by Fair Trade and Robinson-Patman, is designed
to place limits upon the free play of competition in the alleged interest of these
firms which, for one reason or another, are not equipped to survive the storms
of rigorous competition.... To state the matter in its simplest terms, there
appears to be an attempt to bring through governmental intervention into the
economy at one and at the same time free competition and what ...might be
called fair competition.
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON BUREAU OF BUSINESS RESEARCH, REGULATION OF RETAIL

COMIETITION IN WASHINGTON 1

(1963).

It has been argued that the dual purposes of protecting competitors and protecting
competition may be incompatible when both purposes are sought to be achieved by a
blanket prohibition on below cost selling; in fact, such prohibition may operate to
defeat both purposes:
The blanket prohibition ....when they depend for their enforcement on private
action, are peculiarly vulnerable to control by the larger units whose interest
in price stability is the greatest, thus assisting the very competitors against
whom sales-below-cost prohibitions are often said to be directed.
Comment, Sales Below Cost Prohibitions: Private Price Fixing Under State Laz',
57 YALE L.J. 391, 401-02 (1948).
1 WASH. REv. CODE § 19.90.070 (1959) (closing out a stock, disposing of damaged goods, acting under court order or meeting competition).
' WASH. Rxv. CODE § 19.90.010 (1959).
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cost, whichever is lower, of the article or product to the distributor and
vendor plus the cost of doing business by said distributor and vendor."
A. Invoice Cost
Unless the seller is producing his own products or has conspired
with his supplier to falsify invoice prices, actual invoice cost of a given
item to the seller is readily determinable. If the seller has purchased
the sale item in several lots at more than one invoice price, he might
appropriately average the total cost over the number of items placed
on sale to produce an "average invoice cost." It would clearly not be
within the spirit of the statute to contend that the lowest invoice price
established the invoice cost for the entire lot (although this might
establish the replacement cost).
Occasionally a seller will contend that he should be permitted to
purchase several grades of the same item and sell the high grades and
the low grades at a single price based on an average invoice cost. This
scheme results in a below cost sale of the higher grades (to say nothing
of the consumer deception that may inhere in such a practice) and
should be considered a violation of the act.
B. Replacement Cost
Replacement cost is a more elusive concept, not expressly defined in
the Washington statute. The principal problem lies in determining
what period in time will be used to establish replacement cost. Some
statutes provide that the lowest market price in a specified period of
time-usually the thirty days preceding the sale-will be considered
to be replacement cost. 3 In the absence of such a definition, the question is raised whether it is proper to look back through an earlier
period for a low replacement cost, and, if so, how far back one may
look.
These questions should be answered by considering the legislature's
purpose in including the replacement cost concept in the statute. If a
merchant made a bad buy on a product some time before his sale, or if
he purchased the product prior to an unexpected decline in the cost of
that product, he will be stuck with a high cost inventory although the
""Replacement Cost" is expressly defined in the unfair practice laws of seven
states. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1461(4) (1956); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51-421 (c)
(1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 112(c) (1957); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-10-10 (2)
(Supp. 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. fit. 25, §598.2(c) (1966); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 13-5-7(4) (1953); and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 100.30(c) (1957). Six of the seven states
limit replacement cost to the thirty day period preceding the date of sale or the

date offered for sale. North Dakota is the only exception, setting no time limit.
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same goods are available to others at much lower cost. In such a case,
the merchant should not be held to his invoice cost but should be able
to sell the item at a price based on current replacement cost. To allow
the merchant to do so tends to strengthen rather than injure competition.
Two factors should be present before replacement cost is invoked.
First, the lower replacement cost should have been an actual market
price either at the time of the sale or during the period prior to the
sale when the goods in question would customarily have been ordered
by the seller to supply his stock for the sale in question. (This prior
period should in no event extend to a time earlier than the date the
merchant's actual inventory at its higher invoice cost was ordered.)
Second, there must actually have been a supply of the product in
existence which could have been purchased at the lower replacement
cost in a quantity sufficiently large to replace the old stock of goods
being sold.
For example, assume that the Holiday Bake Shoppe advertises plum
puddings at forty-nine cents per pound as a featured sale item the
week before Christmas. At the time of the sale, and for two weeks
before, the wholesale price of these plum puddings (i.e., the price at
which Holiday Bake Shoppe could buy them) was fifty-three cents
per pound. Earlier, the wholesale price had been forty-eight cents per
pound. Holiday manufactured on its own premises about one-third of
the plum puddings that it sold during the sale. Its manufacturing cost
for these was forty-five cents per pound. The other two-thirds it
ordered one month before the sale at forty-eight cents per pound.
Holiday takes the position that eleven months before the sale plum
puddings were available on the market at thirty-five cents per pound
and that its replacement cost is, therefore, thirty-five cents or, in the
alternative, its forty-five cent manufacturing cost was its replacement
cost. To allow the Holiday Bake Shoppe to justify its Christmas price
with a "replacement cost" based on the market price of the preceding
January would be a gross distortion of the replacement cost concept.
Holiday's manufacturing cost is not its replacement cost, because it
had no additional "home-baked" plum puddings available. (Even if
Holiday's plum pudding capacity were not exhausted by the puddings
it did make, it chose not to make any more, and by its own action there
was no available replacement supply at that cost). The manufacturing
cost is part of Holiday's invoice cost. Its lowest invoice cost would be
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forty-seven cents, a weighted average of forty-five and forty-eight
cents.
The only real question about Holiday's replacement cost is whether
it is the wholesale price at the time of the sale or the wholesale price
two weeks before the sale. If it is customary in the trade to order this
item two weeks or more in advance, Holiday can reasonably contend
that its replacement cost was forty-eight cents.
At either figure, replacement cost is irrelevant because the fortyseven cent invoice cost is lower. Holiday's forty-nine cent sale price is
below cost if its cost of doing business is more than two cents per
pound.
C. Cost of Doing Business
The act requires that the cost of doing business be added to the
lower of invoice or replacement cost to compute the legal selling price.
Allocation of the cost of doing business to each item sold is far from a
precise process. Yet the merchant who is trying to abide by the law
needs to know at what price he can sell his commodity without risking
criminal prosecution or an injunctive action.
The Washington statute merely defines cost of doing business by
addressing itself to those expenses usually labeled "overhead. '32 While
this definition is not worded in precise accounting concepts, it is a
definition with which accountants can work and has been tentatively
approved by the Washington Supreme Court. 3 It does not, however,
remove the uncertainties inherent in cost accounting, but it is doubtful
that any statutory definition could achieve such a result.
The cost of doing business not only varies from merchant to merchant but between different stores owned by the same merchant and
between departments in a single store. Furthermore, allocation of cost
to a particular commodity also depends on the method of cost accounting followed.
" WASH. REv. CODE § 19.90.010 (1959) defines "cost of doing business" or "overhead expense" as "all costs of doing business incurred in the conduct of such
business and must include without limitation the following items of expense:
Labor (including salaries of executives and officers), rent, depredation, selling
cost, maintenance of equipment, delivery costs, credit losses, all types of licenses,
taxes, insurance and advertising.
' State v. Sears, 4 Wn. 2d 200, 214, 103 P.2d 337, 344 (1940). The Washington
court gave qualified approval to the statutory definition of "cost of doing business."
It was noted by the court that it was considering the adequacy of the definition
solely on the basis of the statutory language, and that it was hampered by the lack of
a proper factual background. The court was "not prepared to say... judged by the
language of the statute alone, that simple and proper accounting practices will not
disclose the necessary information."
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Returning to Holiday Bake Shoppe, the question is whether the cutprice plum pudding should bear the same proportion of overhead cost
as every other item in the store. For convenience, the cost of doing
business is frequently expressed as a percentage of the costs of goods
sold (i.e., x per cent of invoice cost). It does not follow, however,
that overhead expenses are necessarily to be allocated according to the
ratio established by the cost of goods sold of the item in question,
divided by the cost of goods sold of the entire department or the entire
store. The cost of goods sold approach is an easy and very common
method of allocating indirect expenses. However, when Holiday is
pressed to defend its plum pudding sale it may advance any or all of
the following arguments: (1) some or all of the indirect expenses
should be allocated according to floor space and since plum puddings
are a small-size but high-cost item this will produce a substantially
smaller cost of doing business allocable to the puddings; (2) certain
items handled by the bake shop, such as cream puffs, require special
handling and refrigeration and a proportionately larger amount of the
indirect expenses should be allocated to them; (3) if a substantially
larger number of plum puddings were sold during the sale than normally would have been sold, then the cost of doing business per plum
pudding during the sale is less than at other times; (4) low margin
items should not bear as much overhead as high margin items.
These arguments suggest the wide range of problems that may be
raised by a defendant prosecuted for selling at or very slightly above
his invoice cost. The Washington statute attempts to overcome these
problems by providing that proof of average over-all cost of doing
business for any particular inventory period when added to the invoice
or replacement cost 3" "shall be presumptive evidence of cost." This
clause allows the enforcer to fulfill his burden of proof by a more or
less prefunctory showing, but the defendant may still establish that his
actual cost of doing business, with reference to the particular commodity at the time in question, was different from his over-all cost of
doing business.
A number of states, including Idaho, 35 specify a fixed minimum
percentage above invoice cost as an arbitrary cost of doing business,3
which gives the retailer assurance that he has not violated the statute if
4

WAs H. RFv. CODE

§ 19.90.120 (1959).

IDAHO CODE Axx., §48.403(b) (3) (Supp. 1965).
See 2 TsuuE RFG. REP. 1f 6709 (1965).
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he marks up his commodity to at least the stated percentage. Although
this approach eliminates most of the arguments outlined above, it is
arbitrary and inflexible. It fails to allow for variations in efficiency
between different retailers, or for overhead expenses that do not bear a
direct relationship to the cost of goods sold. If no such allowance is
made, it is questionable whether cost of doing business ought to be
taken into account at all in a below-cost sales statute.
It is submitted that below-cost sales legislation would be improved
by disregarding the cost of doing business. A violation should be defined merely with reference to invoice cost or replacement cost, whichever is lower. In such a statute invoice and replacement cost should be
more carefully defined to include, not only actual invoice price, but
also costs of shipment and any manufacturing or packaging processes
that take place after the item is acquired."
III. THE INJURY AND INTENT PROBLEM
The most significant portion of the Washington Unfair Practices
Act is the 141-word sentence constituting section 19.90.040,8 set out
in the appendix to this article. The Washington court has noted that
this sentence "is not a model of legislative draftsmanship."39 It is
clear, however, that proof of injurious result is an essential element of
some types of violation as is proof of predatory purpose or intent.
What is not clear is whether both injury and intent must be proven
for all violations, and what type of injury or intent must be established
in those instances where one or both are required.
' For a time, the Washington law was enforced with respect to fryer chickens
only if a retailer sold the fryer below his invoice cost, no allowance being made for
the cost of doing business. It was found that certain retailers circumvented the law,
as so enforced, by buying chickens before they had been dressed. They thus carried
on a number of manufacturing processes within the retail store. This greatly increased their cost of doing business but it decreased their invoice cost. Interview
With William Mudge, Manager, Washington State Fryer Commission, January 12,
1967.
' WASH. REv. CODE § 19.90.040 (1959) provides:
Price cutting practices forbidden-Generally. It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in business within this state to sell any article or product at less
than the cost thereof to such vendor, or give away any article or product, for the
purpose of injuring competitors or destroying competition, or to use any
article or product as a "loss leader," or in connection with any sale to make or
give, or to offer to make or give, any special or secret rebate, payment, allowance, refund, commission or unearned discount, whether in the form of money
or otherwise, or to secretly extend to certain purchasers special services or
privileges not extended to all purchasers purchasing upon like terms and conditions, or to make or enter into any collateral contract or device of any nature,
whereby a sale below cost is effected, to the injury of a competitor, and where
the same destroys or tends to destroy competition.
' Martin v. Alienkoff, 63 Wn. 2d 842, 846, 389 P.2d 422, 425 (1964).
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A. The Injury Requirement
It will be noted that the statute refers to three injury concepts:
(1) "injury of a competitor"; (2) "destruction of competition"; (3)
"tendency to destroy competition."4 The definition of "loss leader,"
which must be incorporated into this sentence, refers only to injury to
competitors, especially diversion of trade.
In practice it is much easier for the person enforcing the law to
prove that a competitor was injured by diversion of trade than to
prove that competition was destroyed. The evidence of injury available to the enforcer will generally be testimony of the defendant's
competitors to the effect that during the period of the defendant's sale
they did not sell as much of the sale items as they should have, and
that their business was down generally. For example, in the Holiday
Bake Shoppe case, Holiday's competitors will testify that after Christmas they had 500 pounds of plum pudding left over which they had
to sell at greatly reduced prices or throw out. This type of testimony
will establish injury to a competitor, but does it prove destruction of or
even a tendency to destroy competition?
If proof that competitors have actually gone out of business is required, it will not be possible to enforce the law until the evil it is
designed to prevent, destruction of competition, has occurred. Consequently, even if the statute expressly required a showing of destruction
of competition, it could be persuasively argued that, consistent with
the purpose of the law and the direction to construe liberally,4 2 proof
of something less than actual destruction of competition should establish the violation.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky has done precisely this in stating:4 3
Our opinion is that to the extent a competitor is caused to lose business,
competition is destroyed .... Considering the nature and the policy of the
statute, we think the expressions "injuring competitors" and "destroying competition" were intended to describe one thing rather than two,
that is, a reduction of competition at the expense of a competitor.
At the most the Washington statute merely requires a showing of a
tendency to destroy competition. The language at the end of section
WAsH. REv. CODE § 19.90.040 (1959).
WAsH. REv. CODE § 19.90.010 (1959).
WASH. REv. CODE § 19.90.910 (1959).

'o
12

Laundry Operating Co. v. Spaulding Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 383 S.W.2d
364, 366 (Ky. 1964)
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19.90.040 is disjunctive: "where the same destroys or tends to des'44
troy competition.
The specific problems posed by the particular phrasing of the Washington statute are: (1) whether the proof required to show a tendency to destroy competition is different from the proof required to
show injury to a competitor; and (2) to which of the violations set
forth in section 19.90.040 the tendency to destroy competition requirement applies.
In Martin v. Aleinikoff,45 the Washington court divided section
19.90.040 into six infinitive clauses followed by two adverbial phrases.
(See Appendix, Part B.) For convenience, the grammatical designations used by the court in Martin will be followed in this article, and
reference will hereafter be made to infinitive clauses 1 through 6 and
adverbial phrases "a" and "b".
The issue in Martin was whether a secret rebate or an extension of
special services was unlawful only if it resulted in a sale below cost.
Narrowly read, Martin merely holds that adverbial phrase "a" modifies and refers to infinitive clauses 4 and 5. It concludes that there is
no violation of infinitive clauses 4 and 5 without a sale below cost. The
opinion carefully leaves open the question whether adverbial phrases
"a"and "b" apply to the other infinitive clauses.4 6
In applying the injury requirement to a specific factual situation
the attorney must now juggle four concepts: (1) the incredibly complex section 19.90.040; (2) the tortured grammatical analysis suggested in Martin; (3) the definition of "loss leader" in section 19.90.010; and (4) the purpose of the statute, especially as expressed in
section 19.90.910.
The following conclusions are suggested with respect to the injury
requirement:
(1) It is never necessary to prove actual destruction of competition
under the Washington statute. Proof of a tendency to destroy competition is in all events sufficient.
(2) It should not be necessary to prove even a tendency to destroy
"While the Washington court has not construed this phrase, the Supreme Court
of Minnesota has expressly noted that the language in the Washington statute provides a "less absolute, alternative basis for establishing a violation." State v.

Wolkoff, 250 Minn. 504, 85 N.W.2d 401, 410 n.19 (1957).
63 Wn. 2d 842, 389 P.2d 422 (1964).
"63 Wn. 2d at 850, 389 P.2d at 428. The court concludes that "'whereby a sale
below cost is affected to the injury of a competitor' refers not only to the last antecedent, but to each antecedent to which it may refer without impairing the meaning

of the sentence."
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competition as a separate element in establishing a violation under the
loss-leader clause. The definition of "loss leader" in section 19.90.010
contains its own alternative elements of proof. Elements which are
expressed as alternatives in the loss leader definition would become
absolute requirements if it were held that adverbial phrases "a" and
"b" apply and modify the loss leader clause, infinitive clause 3.
(3) It may be assumed as a corollary of Martin, that adverbial
phrases "a" and "b" apply to infinitive clauses 4, 5, and 6 of section
19.90.040 and that in connection with secret rebates, special services,
or collateral devices, it is necessary to show a tendency to destroy
competition.4 7 However, even here it can be argued that a tendency to
destroy competition is no different than proof of injury to a competitor
through diversion of trade.48
(4) It is not clear whether the injury requirements apply to the
violations expressed in the first two clauses of section 19.90.040. Although the requirement may be applied without "impairing the meaning of the sentence, ' 49 the reasoning of Martin is no longer applicable
because the first two clauses clearly refer to sale below cost situations.
Therefore, the two adverbial phrases need not be construed as limiting
the sale below cost clauses. For this reason, it can be argued that if
an injury requirement is read into the first two clauses, it should be a
reasonable requirement that admits of proof consistent with the overall purpose of the statute. Thus, it should only be necessary to show
injury to a competitor and such proof should be deemed to establish a
tendency to destroy competition.
In the opinion of the writer, the statute should be interpreted, or
amended, to make it clear that nothing more than proof of injury to a
competitor is necessary to fulfill the injury requirement of the statute.
(See Appendix, Part D.)
B. The Intent Requirement
Washington courts seem to have assumed that an intent to injure
competition must be shown as an element of every violation of the
" If the interpretation of this section could be approached as an original matter
without regard to Martin, it would seem more logical to treat infinitive clauses 4,
5 and 6 as a single clause. It would then be clear that the adverbial phrases at the
end modified this entire clause and only this clause. An illustration of the statute
so broken down appears in the Appendix, Part C.

'The Tenth Circuit has noted: "For surely there is no more effective means of
lessening competition or creating monopolies than the debilitation of a competitor."
Atlas Building Products Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 954
(10th Cir. 1959).
'" See note 46 supra.
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Unfair Practices Act. In Martin, the court stated:50

"Intent to

injure or destroy competition is, in truth, the touchstone ...." A similar statement appears in State v. Sears."
The assumption that intent must be proven in each violation is
extraordinary in view of the statutory language. Of the six infinitive
clauses in section 19.90.040, only the second clause, directed at giving
away merchandise, specifies that the purpose of the defendant must be
shown. The other five clauses make no reference to intent or purpose.
Ordinarily, it would seem that a reference to purpose in one clause
with no reference to purpose in the other clauses would indicate a
legislative design that intent was not required by the other clauses. 2
No case prior to State ex rel. O'Connell v. Albertson's, Inc.,"a directly

presented the issue whether proof of predatory intent is required.
Deciding whether a sale below cost is a requirement of every violation,
the court in Martin manipulated the clauses at the end of section
19.90.040 (result, not intent, clauses). The court, however, appears

to have confused intent and result, or at least failed to distinguish the
difference between proof of purpose and proof of result.

4

The Ne-

-63 Wn. 2d 842, 844, 389 P.2d 422, 424 (1964).
" State v. Sears, 4 Wn. 2d 200, 217, 103 P.2d 337, 345 (1940). The court states
that of the twenty six states having fair sales acts "the majority require an intent
to injure competitors, and... the acts having this requirement have withstood the
attack of unconstitutionality." The opinion goes on to conclude that "the difference
between the acts which have been held constitutional and those declared to be unconstitutional" is the presence of the intent requirement.
"The construction problem presented by the Washington statute is to be contrasted with the situation in California as interpreted in Wholesale Tobacco
Dealers Bureau v. National Candy & Tobacco Co., 11 Cal. 2d 634, 82 P.2d 3 (1938).
The section of the California statute which was interpreted by the Wholesale
Tobacco Dealers' case contained the equivalent of only infinitive clauses 1 and 2 of
the Washington statute, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17043 (West 1964). The purpose language appeared at the end of the entire section. The California court was
faced with the question whether modifying language at the end modified the entire
section or merely the last preceding clause. Where the purpose language appears not
at the end but only in the second of six infinitive clauses, it is submitted that the
construction problem is substantially dissimilar.
'68 Wash. Dec. 2d 254, 412 P.2d 755 (1966).
The majority first emphasized a result requirement, 63 Wn. 2d 842, 844, 389 P.2d
422, 424 (1964) :
Woven into the fabric of the Unfair Practices Act and running as a thread
throughout is the thought that the proscribed business conduct must result in
the injury of a competitor or destroy or tend to destroy competition.
In a subsequent paragraph, emphasis is placed on an intent requirement, id. at
844, 389 P.2d at 424:
Intent to injure or destroy competition is, in truth, the touchstone, for the
Unfair Practices Act provides criminal penalties as well as civil relief.
A dissenting opinion rephrases the majority in terms of result, id. at 858, 389
P.2d at 432:
Injury to or destruction of competition, as the majority point out, is the touchstone of the Unfair Practices Act.
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braska case, Nelson v. Tilly, 5 on which the court relied in Martin
contains similar confusion. 6
In Albertson's, the state sought to establish a violation under both
clause 1 (sale below cost), and clause 3 (loss leader). Although the
trial court found a sale below cost which had injured competitors, it
refused to conclude that there had been a violation of the statute on the
ground that the state failed to show a purpose to injure competitors.
The principal question on appeal appeared to be whether an intent or
purpose to injure competitors was an essential element of the sale
below cost or loss leader violation. In a five-to-four opinion, the supreme court affirmed the trial court, not on the intent question, but on
the ground that defendant was within the meeting competition exception to the statute. The four dissenting judges, rejecting the meeting
competition defense considered the intent problem. They concluded
"... that the legislature intended by the first and third infinitive

clauses (sec. 19.90.040) to prevent sales below invoice cost and the
'
use of 'loss leaders,' regardless of intent or purpose. 5
Loose references to intent in earlier opinions seem to have been
prompted by a concern that a statute containing criminal sanctions
might be unconstitutional if it did not require proof of intent. The
dissenters in Albertson's pointed out that there are many criminal
statutes which require no proof of intent and which are, nevertheless,
constitutional."8
137 Neb. 327, 289 N.W. 388 (1939).
289 N.W. at 395 (1939) :
It will be noted therefore that in subdivisions (i)and (k) the prohibited
acts are unlawful only where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly or to injure or
destroy the business of a competitor. The act itself is not prohibited; it is
the act accompanied by an intent to accomplish a result....
(Emphasis added.)
68 Wash. Dec. 2d at 268, 412 P.2d at 764 (1966).
It was also argued in the case that WAsH. Rnv. CODE § 19.90.060 (1959) ("...and
in any such action proof of one or more acts of selling or giving away any article
or product below cost or at discriminatory prices, together with proof of the injurious effect of such acts, shall be presumptive evidence of the purpose or intent
to injure competitors or destroy competition . . .") indicates that all violations must
require intent. The dissent concluded the presumption applies only where intent is
expressly required and creates no requirement of intent under clauses 1 and 3. Id. at
265, 412 P.2d at 762.
WId. at 265, 267, 412 P.2d at 762, 763 (1966). The Robinson-Patman Act § 1, 49
Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964) is given as an example.
The dissenters concluded, 68 Wash. Dec. 2d at 267, 412 P.2d at 763:
...in enacting laws to promote the general welfare or establish police regulations for public protection, or in authorizing the state to foster and preserve
the public peace, health, safety and morals, in short, in defining conduct or
actions malum prohibitum, the legislature may constitutionally omit intent,
purpose or scienter as essential elements of the forbidden conduct.
Even if criminal intent were required, would not such intent normally be shown
'
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Since proof of intent is expressly required only in connection with a
clause 2 (give away) violation, such a requirement can be read into the
other infinitive clauses only by implication. But the implication of an
intent requirement tends to frustrate the purpose of the legislation.
Such implication is, therefore, unwarranted unless necessary to save
the statute from constitutional attack. It is extremely difficult to prove
an intent to injure a competitor which is anything more than normal
competitive intent. Actually, the competition which the statute seeks
to "foster and encourage"" is inseparable from an intent to injure
competitors in the broadest sense. Competition arises from the desire
to attract additional business from diverting business from the competitor. 0°
In economic legislation of this type, the intent of the defendant
should be irrelevant. The legislature has determined that certain
pricing practices lead to economically undesirable consequences. Accepting this determination, the undesirable consequences follow no
matter what intent is secretly harbored by the merchant price cutter."'
Most cases in other jurisdictions which have considered the intent
question have done so in the context of the inquiry: Is the sweep of
the law so broad as to make it an invalid exercise of the police power
if it prohibits all below cost sales without limitation? Where the
statute requires proof of either intent to injure or the result of injury,
courts have had little difficulty in overcoming this constitutional objection. 2 At least thirteen states (including both Oregon and Idaho)
by proof of intent to sell below cost-not proof of intent to injure a competitor?

(To convict a murderer, the state does not need to show that the defendant intended

to deprive the victim's wife of a source of income, but merely that the defendant
intended to inflict the fatal blow.)
t
'WASH. REV. CODE § 19.90.910 (1959).
The Kentucky Court has compared the merchant who argues that his desire
to attract business is not an intent to injure competitors to the walrus in "Through

The Looking Glass":
In "Through the Looking Glass," we are told the walrus shed copious tears as he
devoured the innocent oysters who had accepted his invitation to stroll along
the beach. He meant them no harm, of course. He merely wished to eat them.
Laundry Operating Co. v. Spaulding Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 383 S.W.2d 364,
366 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964).
0 See Clark, Statutory Restrictions on Selling Below Cost, 11 VAND.
L. REV.
105, 113 (1957): "If the statute is aimed at eliminating types of price cutting
vhich are socially or economically harmful, the price cutter's mental state is irrelevant."
' Decisions expressly upholding below cost sales statutes against such an attack
include: May's Drug Stores, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 242 Iowa 319, 45 N.W.2d
245 (1950); State v. Wolkoff, 250 Minn. 504, 85 N.W.2d 401 (1957); McIntire v.
Borofsky, 95 N.H. 174, 59 A.2d 471 (1948). Only one decision has been found
striking down a statute which required proof of either intent or result. Englebrecht
v. Day, 201 Okla. 585, 208 P.2d 538 (1949).
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presently have "either intent or result" statutes." The Washington law
can readily be interpreted as an "either intent or result" law, if it is
felt that an unlimited prohibition of sales below cost is too broad. 4
From the particular wording of the Washington statute, several
conclusions can be drawn:
(1) It is clear that proof of purpose to injure competitors is required
in connection with establishing a violation under infinitive clause 2,
the give-away clause. The legislature may have felt that if a person is
going to be in the posture of violating a law for giving away merchandise, a predatory intent should be shown in addition to the mere act of
giving away.
(2) It is possible to argue that the purpose requirement in clause 2
also modifies clause 1. There is, however, no rule of statutory construction upon which to base an argument that the purpose requirement in a clause modifies preceding clauses.
(3) The presumption for proof of purpose in section 19.90.060
speaks of proving intent in connection with selling below cost and
giving away merchandise. It does not speak of proving purpose in
connection with loss leaders and is not a basis for building an argument that a loss leader violation requires proof of purpose.
(4) It must be borne in mind that a purpose to injure competitors,
if this can be distinguished from a normal competitive purpose, is
very difficult to prove. To the extent that proof of such purpose is
required, it will greatly increase the difficulty and the burden on the
plaintiff in enforcing the statute, a burden that seems inconsistent with
the purpose of the statute expressed in section 19.90.110.
In summary, upon close scrutiny, it seems clear that the Washington
statute does not require proof of intent in connection with a "loss
2 TRADE REG. REP. ff 6771 (1965).
It is clear that most state courts today would uphold a law which prohibited
sales below cost without requiring proof of either intent or effect. Attention is
directed to the comments in May's Drug Stores, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 242 Iowa
319, 45 N.W.2d 245, 252 (1950):
We see no good reason to support the argument that intent must be a necessary
element in order to save the constitutionality of the statute. The legislature is
prohibiting an act, a business practice, declared to be destructive of competitors
and free competition. The state of mind of the doer of the act is immaterial.
The question whether the regulation bears a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose of protecting and promoting free competition turns upon the act
or business practice prohibited and whether that act or business practice can
reasonably be thought destructive of free competition. We see no dividing line
which would say due process is served if the profitless sale with intent to
injure either a competitor or free competition is prohibited and denied if that
motive is not present. The legislature is not condemning a state of mind.
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leader" violation." The only real intent questions should be whether
the purpose language in clause 2, the give-away clause, also modifies
clause 1, the sale below cost clause. The writer (and at least four of
the present supreme court judges) would resolve this question in the
negative to preserve the enforceability of the statute. If the court
should decide that a "loss leader" violation does not require proof of
intent, but that a sale below cost violation does, it would also be called
upon to distinguish between a "loss leader" and a sale below cost.
Although these terms are not necessarily synonymous, it is difficult to
construct a distinction from the definitions in the statute. 66 It is even
more difficult to develop a logical argument for any such distinction.
Both the injury and intent problems could be greatly clarified by
legislative action. A suggested redraft consistent with the foregoing
comments (without making any substantive change) appears in the
Appendix, Part D.

IV. THE MEETING COMPETITION

DEFENSE

One section of the Unfair Practices Act carves out four exceptions
from the operation of the statute:6 7 (1) a sale to close out stock or
prevent loss by spoilage or depreciation of perishable or seasonal
goods; (2) a sale of damaged or deteriorated goods; (3) a sale made
under court order; (4) a sale made to meet competition. Each of these
exceptions is accompanied by various qualifications and the statute
should be read closely before attempting to invoke an exception.
Other jurisdictions have held that the defendant has the burden of
proving each of the facts necessary to bring his sale within an exception.Os
'c Dewell & Gittinger, The Washington Anti-trust Laws, 36 WASH. L. REv. 239,
276 (1961) indicate their conclusion that "'loss leaders' conduct may violate the
act even though not done with the purpose or intent or injuring... ." See also the
analysis of this statute by MARcuS, GILLAM & GREINER, REGULATION OF RETAIL

COMPETITION IN WASHINGTON

35, 65. (Bureau of Business Research, University of

Washington, 1963), which assumes that intent must be proven as an element of all
violations.
C It is clear that a loss leader necessarily involves a sale below cost; however, not
all sales below cost need be loss leaders. A "loss leader," in the usual sense, is a
sale designed to attract customers into the store so that they will purchase products
other than the loss leaders. These other products may be marked up above the
normal margin. It thus contains an element of deception and is directly harmful to
the consumer as well as to competition. It is difficult to conceive of the possibility
that a store, selling principally one item, would be able to engage in loss leader
activity. For example, it is doubtful that a gas station selling gasoline below cost
is selling gasoline as a loss leader. Yet the definition of loss leader in § 19.90.010
would seem to include even the service stations selling gasoline below cost.
WASH. REv. CODE § 19.90.070 (1959).
State ex rel. Anderson v. Commercial Candy Co., 166 Kan. 432, 201 P.2d 1034
(1949). People v. Gordon, 234 P.2d 287 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
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The meeting competition exception requires that a merchant be
engaged in an endeavor in good faith to meet the legal prices of a
competitor who is selling the same article or product in the same
locality or trade area and in ordinary channels of trade.6 9 The statute
defines "ordinary channels of trade.17 0 It neglects, however, to define

"trade area," "same article or product" or "competitor" (although it
promises a definition of the latter term71). The following comments
suggest some filling for the statutory gaps.
A. The Same Locality or Trade Area
The conventional notion is that a trade area is limited by the distance consumers will travel to shop for a better buy of the commodity
in question. It may be a small area for groceries and a larger area for
furniture. Whether any given retailer is a competitor in the same
trade area is a question of fact.7 ' An argument for a more expansive
approach may be based on modem communication media because
customers of a store in a small town may be exposed to ads from
large cities. If the customers will actually travel to the large cities to
obtain a better bargain, then a store in the small town should be entitled to "meet" the prices of the city stores. Clearly this depends on
what the commodity in question is, not merely on whether the customers have been exposed to lower prices.
B. The Same Article or Product
This requirement poses a question of degree: at what point is item
X so similar to item Y that it is the "same product" within the contemplation of statutory language? Although there has been very little
litigation on this point, it is not to be expected that a court would
require absolute identity. For example, merchant B should be able to
sell drip grind Hills Brothers coffee below cost in order to meet the
legal price of merchant A on regular grind Hills' Brothers coffee. But
could merchant B meet a Hills' Brothers coffee price by selling Maxwell House coffee below cost? By selling imported Turkish coffee
WAsHa. REv. CODE § 19.90.070 (4) (1959) excepts a sale made
In an endeavor made in good faith to meet the legal prices of a competitor as
herein defined selling the same article or product, in the same locality or trade
area, and in the ordinary channels of trade as herein defined....
WAsH. REv. CODE § 19.90.010 (1959).
n See note 69 supra.

72Delineation of a trade area is closely related to the definition of a competitor

or competition-the geographical aspect being merely one part of a competition

definition. In Albertson's, the court treated the entire tri-city area of Richland,
Pasco and Kennewick as a single trade area for a sale of fryer chickens.
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below cost? Could merchant B meet a low price on Rinso soap by
selling Tide soap below cost?
What if the manufacturer of nationally known soap X also packages
the same soap for a large chain store under the name of the chain store
and sells it for substantially less than brand X. May merchant B meet
the chain store's price on its specially packaged soap by selling soap
X below cost? The product is the same except in name.7 3 The spirit
of the statute would seem to indicate that if the difference between
products is such that merchant B's product is more desirable from an
overall consumer point of view than the chain store product, the
products are not "the same" within the meaning of the exception.
In Albertson's, the state contended unsuccessfully that cut up fryer
chickens were a different product from whole body fryers. Albertson's
had sold whole body fryers at twenty-nine cents per pound and cut
up fryers at thirty-three cents per pound. Both prices were below cost.
Albertson's could point to other twenty-nine cent whole body fryer
prices to justify its price, but there had been no sales of cut up fryers
as low as thirty-three cents. The supreme court held that Albertson's
sale, as to both whole body and cut up birds, was within the meeting
competition defense, without mentioning the state's contention that
there was no competition as to cut up birds. This treatment may be
contrasted with the position of the court in Bornstein Sea Foods, Inc.
v. State,7 4 where it held that filet of sole was a different product from
whole sole for purposes of determining whether there had been a
manufacturing process taxable under the business and occupation tax.
C. What is an Endeavor in Good Faithto Meet the
Legal Prices of a Competitor?
The problems raised by the good faith requirement include: What
actions will establish good faith? What burden is placed on the defendant to ascertain whether his competitor's prices are legal? What
is a competitor? Should the meeting competition exception be re71It has been held that mere difference in brand name does not prevent a product
from being a commodity of "like grade and quality" under § 2(a) of the Clayton Act as
amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits a seller from discriminating
in offering prices to different purchasers of commodities of "like grade and quality".
FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966). The Court carefully notes, however,
that it is not deciding whether the same conclusion applies to § 2(b) which permits
a seller "to meet an equally low price of a competitor."
Whether such a distinction can long be maintained under the federal law, it will

be noted that under Washington law the question is not whether Brand X and the
chain store label are of "like grade and quality" but whether they are the "same
article or product."
7-60 Wn. 2d 169, 373 P.2d 483 (1962).
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stricted to competition for the same purchasing dollar? How far back
in time may a merchant reach to justify his below cost price? May a
merchant anticipate future prices?
In practice, these problems seem to resolve themselves into two legal
questions: Who has the burden of proof of establishing the legality of
the prices met? How far removed in time may the prices met be to
constitute competition?
7
In an early opinion, the Washington court stated: 5
We are, therefore, of the opinion that if a merchant in good faith reduces
his prices to meet those of a competitor, who he in good faith believes
has a legal price, he will not be violating either the intent or the wording
of the act. (Emphasis added.)
From this language it follows that the merchant need not prove that
his competitor's prices were actually legal but merely that he, in good
faith, believed them to be so. He may not act in disregard of their
legality; if he has reason to believe the prices are illegal, this would,
of course, negate his good faith.76
As noted above, it is generally held that the burden falls on the
defendant to prove each of the elements necessary to bring itself within a defense created by an exception to the statute. Some jurisdictions
impose a positive duty on a merchant at least to make an effort to
77
determine if his competitors' prices are legal before he lowers his own.
"'State v. Sears, 4 Wn. 2d 200, 217, 103 P.2d 337, 345 (1940). This language has
been quoted with approval by the California Supreme Court in People v. Pay Less
Drug, 25 Cal. 2d 108, 153 P.2d 9, 14 (1944).
'Cf. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 360 U.S. 334 (1959).
In upholding injunctive relief under the Oklahoma Unfair Sales Act, the Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, stated at page 336:
Appellant claims that this injunction deprives it of a constitutional right to
compete since it forbids meeting the prices of competitors who are selling
below cost. There is no constitutional right to employ retaliation against action
outlawed by a State. Safeway... had ample means, under the state statute, to enjoin the illegal methods of its competitors. It had no constitutional right to embark
on the very kind of destructive price war the Act was designed to prevent.
"It is not necessary for a merchant to ask a competitor what he paid for his sale
items. Hogue v. Kroger Co., 213 Tenn. 365, 373 S.W.2d 714, 719 (1964):
The second point contends that due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution are violated because the retailer has no
way of determining whether a price set by a competitor (and less than invoice
plus eight per cent) is lawful or not....
This contention is without merit. The provisions of T.C.A. § 52-333 sets (sic)
out the proper procedure to be followed by 'any person claiming to be injured'
by such a possible violation.
In general this section provides that a party so aggrieved may file an original
suit for an injunction and for an award of damages, or he may file a complaint
with the Commissioner who 'shall forthwith cause an investigation to be made'
to determine if the price is lawful.
Similar procedures have been available in Washington. When the statute is enforced with respect to certain commodities, Assistant Attorneys General, whose
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In the Albertson's case, however, the majority appears to hold that a
grocery merchant is entitled to a presumption that his competitors'
78
prices are legal.
The state's principal contention on the meeting competition defense
in Albertson's was that the legality of the competitors' prices was
irrelevant because they were too far removed in time to fall within the
exception. Albertson's contended that it was meeting a price offered
five weeks earlier in Walla Walla, and it also pointed to identical
prices of other merchants on the day of its sale.79 It admitted, however, that it did not know there would be other twenty-nine cent prices
when it set its below cost sale price. Rather, it anticipated that this
would be the competitive price on the weekend in question.8 °
The majority opinion referred to both the price five weeks earlier
and the simultaneous price in sustaining Albertson's defense. The
opinion seems to stand for the proposition that prices offered at both
times fall within the exception.
There is scant authority on how far back a merchant may go in
meeting a price. A California trial court has held that a merchant may
meet a price offered six weeks earlier on coffee and soap. 81 In People
v. Payless Drugs,2 however, a California appellate court held that a
competitor's sale nineteen days earlier was too far distant from defendant's sale to be a defense as a matter of law. The decision allowing a merchant to go back six weeks was premised on the assumption
that the exception to the statute was to be liberally construed. The
identities are well known to merchants would, when requested, ascertain and report
back within minutes whether a competitor's price was above cost.
But see Note, 42 WAsH. L. REv. 945 (1967) for a discussion emphasizing the
difficulties the seller faces in determining whether a competitor's prices are legal.
' The Court states, 68 Wash. Dec. 2d at 261, 412 P.2d at 759, that the state "...
should have offered evidence to overcome the presumption that published prices of its
competitors were legal prices."
' The prices in large newspaper ads are typically set about ten days before the
ad appears. Although these prices may be changed up until a day or two before the ad
appears, a merchant does not know what his competitors' prices will be until he has
seen their ad at which time it is too late to change the price appearing in his ad.
Thus, in setting an advertised price allegedly based on the price to be advertised by
a competitor at the same time, it is actually necessary to anticipate the unknown
future price of the competitor, although past experience may allow a merchant to be
reasonably exact.
"'Albertson's also pointed to several tventy-nine cent prices subsequent to its
sale. Although the trial court allowed this evidence and took note of it in its memorandum opinion, the supreme court ignored the subsequent prices. The California
court sustained the rejection of evidence of later prices in Mering v. Yolo Grocery,
127 P.2d 985 (Cal. App. 1942).
" Northern California Food Dealers, Inc. v. Farmers Markets of No. California,
Inc. This decision is not officially reported. It may be read at TRAsDa REG. REP.
(1956 Trade Cas.) 168, 402 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 2, 1956).
143 P.2d 762, 769 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943), aff'd. 25 Cal. 2d 108, 153 P.2d
82
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opinion violates the usual rule of statutory construction that when a
statute is to be liberally construed, an exception is to be narrowly con83
strued.
Competition has been defined as "striving for something that is
sought by another at the same time."8 " The Washington court, in
allowing a merchant to go back five weeks to meet a price, gives a
rather expansive scope to the statutory exception. The Albertson's
opinion raises a question of what limits, if any, are to be imposed on
the prior period of time which can be used to find justifying prices.
Should the statute set a period of time for meeting competition or
should the period of competition be resolved individually for specific
products by reference to the nature of that product, its perishability,
the buying habits of the consumer with respect to the product and the
consumer's ability to remember prior product prices? Does the meeting
competition exception contemplate competition for the same purchasing
dollar? If merchant B is allowed to go back five weeks to meet merchant A's prices, then five weeks later, merchant C will be able to meet
merchant B's price, and the below cost price may be perpetuated
ad infinitum.
The point of greatest significance in the Albertson's decision is the
court's conclusion that competitors' prices the same day as the Albertson's sale (which were unknown to Albertson's when it set its price),
constitute competition within the meeting competition exception. Albertson's was allowed to anticipate that its competitors might sell
fryers at twenty-nine cents per pound. If merchant B can justify his
below cost sale by anticipating that a competitor may be selling at the
same price, it follows that merchant A and merchant B could each offer
an item below cost and justify their otherwise illegal below cost price
solely through the other's otherwise illegal price. Further, does it make
any difference whether a second merchant actually is selling the item
at a low price? Suppose Holiday Bake Shoppe advertises plum puddings for sale below cost at forty-five cents per pound, anticipating
that other bakeries may offer plum puddings at that price (presumably
legal?) at the same time. Then it develops that Holiday has the lowest
price on plum puddings that week. Can not Holiday argue that it was
' 50 AM. Jug. STATUTES § 431 (1944); Spokane v. State, 198 Wash. 682, 693, 89
P.2d 826, 831 (1939).
" National Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. City of Cleveland, 146 N.E.2d 340, 345 (Ohio Ct.
C.P. 1957); Stockton Dry Goods Co. v. Gersch, 221 P.2d 186, 188 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Dawson County, 93 Mont. 310, 19 P.2d 892,
896 (1933).
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engaged in a "good faith anticipation" whether or not anyone else
actually offered plum puddings at forty-five cents per pound? Is
anticipating competition really the same as meeting competition?8 5
Section 2 (b) of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act contains language similar to the Washington meeting competition exception! 8 The body of law interpreting the federal act indicates that, not only must the price met be previously known to the
seller, but the competitors' price must be the causal motivation for
the seller's lowering his price. 7 The Supreme Court of the United
States, in interpreting the Robinson-Patman Act, quoted the House
Committee Report on the bill with approval:8 8
[I]t does not permit him to cut local prices until his competitor has first
offered lower prices and then he can go no further than to meet those
prices .... In other words, the proviso permits the seller to meet the

price actually previously offered by a local competitor. It permits him to
go no further.
The language in State v. Sears8" appears to be consistent with the
federal approach. It must be recognized that the Albertson's decision
greatly expands the meeting competition defense in Washington by
allowing a merchant to advertise and sell below cost in anticipation of
future prices of a competitor. It is questionable whether this expansion is consistent with the purpose of the statute. It allows the exception to be used as a justification for aggressive below cost sellingturning the exception from a shield into a sword.
V.

CONCLUSION

Four simple terms-cost, injury, intent, competition-present many
interpretational problems under the Unfair Practices Act. Certainty
of operation of the statute would be improved by eliminating cost of
'For the merchant who argues that on occasion he can foresee from the wholesale
market conditions that his competitors will be able to secure a product at a lower
cost than his and that he should be allowed to "anticipate" their lower prices, the
answer is: If this is truly the case, he can establish a lower replacement cost to
justify his price. There is no need to warp the meeting competition defense to protect him.
" The Clayton Act § 2, 38 Stat 730 (1914) as amended by the Robinson-Patman
Act § 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964):
... nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case
thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or
facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an
equally low price of a competitor.... (Emphasis added).
"'Pollock, A Checklist on the Meeting Competition Defense, April 1965 Law
Notes, Vol. 1 No. 3, ABA Section of General Practice.
3FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 517 (1963).
4 Wn. 2d 200, 103 P.2d 337 (1940).
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doing business as a factor. This should be accompanied by redefining
invoice and replacement cost to include the cost of all manufacturing
or packaging processes that take place on the merchant's premises.
It may be predicted that when the question is squarely presented,
the Washington court will not require proof of intent as an element of
a "loss leader" violation. No prediction will be ventured as to whether
proof of intent will be required under the sale below cost clause. The
statute would be greatly improved by a revision of section 19.90.040
and the "loss leader" definition. Such revision should make clear (1)
that intent to injure competitors is not an element of either "loss
leader" or "sale below cost" violations; (2) what the difference is
between "loss leader" and "sale below cost," if any; and (3) that all
violations require proof of injury to a competitor. Even without legislative revision, proof of injury to a competitor should be equated to a
tendency to destroy competition.
In 1966 the court expanded the meeting competition defense to
allow a merchant to meet prices offered five weeks earlier, and to anticipate prices to be offered. In the opinion of the writer, this is an unwarranted judicial extension of the exception, inconsistent with the
purpose of the state statute and with federal court interpretations of
the Robinson-Patman Act. The writer's opinion, however, may be
influenced by his involvement in that case. It now appears to be the
law in Washington that a retail merchant (at least in the grocery field)
is entitled to a presumption that the openly advertised prices of his
competitors are legal.
The breadth given the meeting competition defense by the Albertson's decision greatly increases the difficulties of enforcing the Unfair
Practices Act.
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APPENDIX
PART

A

19.90.040 (1959) reads:
Price cutting practices forbidden-Generally. It shall be unlawful
for any person engaged in business within this state to sell any
article or product at less than the cost thereof to such vendor, or
give away any article or product, for the purpose of injuring competitors or destroying competition, or to use any article or product
as a "loss leader," or in connection with any sale to make or give,
or to offer to make or give, any special or secret rebate, payment,
allowance, refund, commission or unearned discount, whether in the
form of money or otherwise, or to secretly extend to certain purchasers special services or privileges not extended to all purchasers
purchasing upon like terms and conditions, or to make or enter into
any collateral contract or device of any nature, whereby a sale below
cost is effected, to the injury of a competitor, and where the same
destroys or tends to destroy competition.

WASH. REV. CODE §

VASH. REv. CODE 19.90.010 (1959) defines "Loss Leader" as follows:

"Loss leader" means any article or product sold at less than cost as
herein defined to induce, promote or encourage, the purchase of
other merchandise or which may have the tendency or capacity to
mislead or deceive purchasers or prospective purchasers, or which
diverts trade from or otherwise injures competitors....
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APPENDIX
PART

B

19.90.040 (1959) AS INTERPRETED BY THE
WASHINGTON COURT IN MARTIN V. ALEINIKOFF:
WASH. REV. CODE §

It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in business
within this state
(1) to sell any article or product at less than the cost
thereof to such vendor,
(2) or give away any article or product, for the purpose of injuring competitors or destroying competition,
(3) or to use any article or product as a "loss leader,"
"Infinitive
Clauses"

(4) or in connection with any sale to make or give, or
to offer to make or give, any special or secret
rebate, payment, allowance, refund, commission
or unearned discount, whether in the form of
money or otherwise,
(5) or to secretly extend to certain purchasers special
services or privileges not extended to all purchasers purchasing upon like terms and conditions.
(6) or to make or enter into any collateral contract
or device of any nature,

"Adverbial
Phrases"

(a) whereby a sale below cost is effected, to the
injury of a competitor, and
(b) where the same destroys or tends to destroy
competition.
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APPENDIX
PART C
WASH. REv. CODE § 19.90.040 (1959)
SUGGESTED INTERPRETATION
(IGNORING MARTIN v. ALEINIKOFF)
Price cutting practices forbidden-Generally. It shall be unlawful for
any person engaged in business within this state
(1) to sell any article or product at less than the cost thereof to such
vendor,
(2) or give away any article or product, for the purpose of injuring
competitors or destroying competition,
(3) or to use any article or product as a "loss leader,"
(4) or in connection with any sale
(a) to make or give, or to offer to make or give, any special or
secret rebate, payment, allowance, refund, commission or
unearned discount, whether in the form of money or otherwise,
(b) or to secretly extend to certain purchasers special services
or privileges not extended to all purchasers purchasing upon
like terms and conditions,
(c) or to make or enter into any collateral contract or device of
any nature,
whereby a sale below cost is effected, to the injury of a competitor,
and where the same destroys or tends to destroy competition.
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APPENDIX
PART

D

SUGGESTED LEGISLATIVE REVISION OF
WAsH. REV. CODE § 19.90.040 (1959)
AND "LOSS LEADER" DEFINITION
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in business within this
state
(1) to sell any article or product at less than the cost thereof to such
vendor where such sale injures a competitor or tends to destroy
competition;
(2) to give away any article or product, for the purpose of injuring
competitors or destroying competition;
(3) to use any article or product as a "loss leader," whereby such
article or product is sold at less than the cost thereof to such
vendor
(a) for the purpose of inducing or encouraging the purchase of
other merchandise, or
(b) if such sale may have the tendency or capacity to mislead or
deceive purchasers, or prospective purchasers of other articles or products;
(4) to effect a sale of any article or product at less than the cost
thereof to such vendor where the same injures a competitor or
tends to destroy competition, by
(a) offering to make or give, or making or giving, any special or
secret rebate, payment, allowance, refund, commission or
unearned discount, whether in the form or money or otherwise, or
(b) extending secretly to certain purchasers special services or
privileges not extended to all purchasers purchasing upon
like terms and conditions, or
(c) making or entering into any collateral contract or device of
any nature.

